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Marginalisation at China’s Multi-Ethnic 
Frontier: The Mongols of Henan Mongolian 
Autonomous County in Qinghai Province 
Ute WALLENBÖCK 
Abstract: China consists of a mosaic of many territorial ethnic 
groups whose historic homelands have been incorporated into the 
modern Chinese state, a process by which the respective populations 
transformed from a “sovereign or semi-sovereign people” (Bulag 
2002: 9) on China’s periphery into “minority nationalities” (ቁᮠ≁᯿, 
shaoshu minzu). In 1950 Mao Zedong initiated the “Ethnic Classifica-
tion Project” whose effect has been the marginalisation of the minori-
ty nationalities. In this paper, I explore the marginalisation of the 
Mongol population of contemporary Henan Mongolian Autonomous 
County within the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in 
southeastern Qinghai Province. By seeking to understand how Henan 
Mongols deal with their socio-political and demographic marginal 
status, the aim of this article is to shed light on how they utilise their 
marginal position, and how they centralise themselves as an independ-
ent party interacting with the civilising missions of China and Tibet. 
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Introduction 
Contemporary Henan Mongolian Autonomous County belongs to 
the Tibetan cultural area of Amdo, which is currently divided among 
the three administrative provinces of Gansu, Sichuan, and Qinghai, 
and which historically can be seen as the periphery of the ancient 
Tibetan empire. In recent years, the Tibetan cultural area of Amdo, a 
region with distinctive political and religious heritage, has received 
considerable attention from Western scholars (Gruschke 2001; Huber 
2002; Karmay 1998; Makley 2008; Nietupski 1999, 2013a, 2013b), as 
well as from Tibetan scholars. Sumpa Khanpo’s (Sum pa khan po ye 
shes dpal’byor) historical work mTsho sngon gyi lo rgyus sogs bkod pa’i 
tshangs glu gsar snyan zhes bya ba bzhugs so (Annals of Kokonor, translated 
by Ho-Chin Yang) provides a good insight into Amdo’s history. This 
work was followed by Brakgonpa’s (Brag dgon pa dkon mchog bstan 
pa rab rgyas) Deb ther rgya mtsho (The Ocean Annals), better known under 
the name mDo smad chos ’byung (Political and Religious History of Amdo). 
In addition, Hortsang Jigme (Hor gtsang ’Jigs med), a Tibetan scholar 
living in India, has published six volumes entitled mDo smad lo rgyus 
chen mo (The Greater History of Amdo), which cover the whole history of 
the Amdo region from the first appearance of inhabitants up to the 
1950s. 
Due to its peripheral location within Greater Tibet, Amdo is 
marginal to Tibet as it is a part of the cultural area of Eastern Tibet, 
which fell outside the administration and governance of Lhasa in the 
1720s. The distinctive characteristic of Amdo is its high linguistic, 
cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity (see Janhunen, Ha, and Tshe 
dpag rnam rgyal 2007). In fact, “for centuries, the margins of the 
Tibetan Plateau have been sites of cultural interactions” (Kolas 2005: 
3). As Gruschke (2001: 107) explains, “Amdo is home to a variety of 
ancient civilizations and historical kingdoms from a number of dif-
ferent ethnic populations.” But by referring to the historical percep-
tion, Paul Nietupski (2013a: 81) states that “Amdo was a place in-
habited by uncivilized bandits, where the state and civilizations were 
not governed.” 
Considering the historical and contemporary situation, I would 
designate present-day Henan County as a frontier region, relying on 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s definition of frontier as the “meeting 
point between savagery and civilization” (Turner 1893). Throughout 
Chinese history, non-Han peoples were considered to be culturally 
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inferior to the Han and were generally referred to as “the barbarians” 
(e.g. 㴞, man, ཧ, yi, ⮚, fan). Even during the Qing dynasty, Qing offi-
cials used to characterise the area around Kokonor (Qinghai Lake) – 
in today’s Qinghai province – as a dangerous place inhabited by 
“barbarians” (Fairbank and Teng 1941: 142). Therefore, Turner’s 
definition can be supported by Owen Lattimore’s definition of fron-
tier as a territory where peoples meet, such as the indigenous and the 
invaders. Referring to Crossley, Siu, and Sutton (2006: 3), the concept 
of the “frontier” includes “social, economic, or cultural fissures inter-
nal to a political order.” But, in fact, China represents itself as homo-
geneous nation-state even though it is an ethnically, geographically, 
and culturally heterogeneous space that is centrally controlled. Since 
the founding of the PRC in 1949, the dominant Han – motivated by 
their political power, their economic status, and their social position-
ing – have defined the minority nationalities as “others.” Weigelin-
Schwiedrzik and Klotzbücher argue that even in China-related politi-
cal sciences, the minority nationalities are mentioned only peripheral-
ly within the political system and are ultimately referred to as “back-
ward” (㩭ਾ, luohou) (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Klotzbücher 2014: 
118). The centralised political system shows bias not only in political 
and economic patterns, but also in cultural and linguistic ones, which 
leads to interethnic inequality between the Han and the minority 
nationalities and, consequently, to social exclusion. Therefore, a di-
chotomy between centre and periphery can be determined, and the 
theoretical framework of marginality can be applied. Hereby, I make 
use of Gurung and Kollmair’s definition of marginality, which says it is  
generally used to describe and analyse socio-cultural, political and 
economic spheres, where disadvantaged people struggle to gain 
access (societal and spatial) to resources, and full participation in 
social life. (Gurung and Kollmair 2005: 10) 
It has been mainly social and cultural anthropologists, such as Glad-
ney (2004) and Bulag (2002), who have drawn attention to the mar-
ginalisation of China’s minority nationalities in a political context. A 
detailed discussion of the relationship between China’s mainstream 
society and the minority nationalities, with a particular focus on the 
Sino-Tibetan borderlands, can be found in Beth (2012), Dai (2009), 
Kolas (2005), Tenzin Jinba (2014), and Weiner (2012).   
According to the centrally directed strategists, pastoralist minori-
ty nationalities, such as Mongols, Tibetans, and Kazakhs, live a 
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“backward” life, which has to be homogenised in terms of education 
and way of life (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Klotzbücher 2014: 129). In 
fact, in relation to China’s other regions, pastoral areas are sparsely 
inhabited and less developed, which leads to a greater degree of de-
pendence on Han-dominated state power. Consequently, the depend-
ence on the central government leads to political disadvantages as 
well as to an economically marginal status within society, which causes 
inequality in distribution of power (see Fischer 2014). Since the pas-
toralists have little to no say in the state-driven decision-making pro-
cess in regard to the political system of the PRC, they are disem-
powered within, or marginalised by, such a system. In fact, pastoral-
ists are only as marginalised as nearly everyone else in China, since 
anyone who is not a party member is excluded from the political 
process. In terms of cultural and linguistic features, pastoralist minor-
ity nationalities experience poor-quality education, and the use of 
minority languages contributes to further social exclusion within the 
PRC due to Putonghua being the main language of government, media, 
communication, and education. As a result, their lack of fluency and 
literacy in Standard Chinese excludes minority nationalities from 
equal access to work and higher education (see Kolas 2005).  
This paper explores Henan Mongols’ marginality and their dif-
ferences and uniqueness vis-à-vis both the Han and the Tibetans, and 
consequently demonstrates their authenticity in certain circumstances. 
Tenzin Jinba has argued that  
marginality should not be looked at as merely a constraint that cir-
cumscribes actors’ choices. Marginality can also be an opportunity 
to act as agents. (Tenzin Jinba 2014: 6) 
Along this vein, I seek to understand how Henan Mongols utilise 
their marginal position and centralise themselves as an independent 
party in their interactions with the civilising missions of China and 
Tibet. And, furthermore, I examine from an ethno-cultural and his-
torical perspective how Henan Mongols appropriate their ethnic 
marginality in order to construct an image of their distinctiveness. 
Having spent many years among the Tibeto-Mongolians of He-
nan County, I am well acquainted with the region and its people, and 
I have accumulated a great deal of textual and ethnographic material 
that provides the basis of this work: Between 1995 and 1999, I con-
ducted several field trips to Labrang (༿⋣, Xiahe) and adjacent re-
gions in the course of preparing my master’s thesis. During the fol-
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lowing three years, I was mainly based in Labrang and improved my 
understanding of the local Chinese dialect and gained fluency in the 
local Amdo Tibetan dialect. From 2004 until 2010, I lived and 
worked in Xining, where I gained knowledge of Tibetan-Mongolian 
issues from several fields. Through these experiences I managed to 
build an extensive local network and have maintained the close ties to 
locals that I have been cultivating since my very first field trip. During 
my most recent one-month field trips in 2011 and in 2014, my methods 
included narrative interviews and intimate discussions with local 
women and men, illiterate and literate, with and without ties to the 
government. All interviews were conducted in Amdo Tibetan. My 
research procedure entailed recording, keeping minutes of, and tran-
scribing the interviews; later on in the process, relevant sections were 
translated and subdivided into topical clusters. All relevant interview 
data were processed first on an issue-related and then on a theory-
related level. I then supplemented the interview data by cross-check-
ing printed sources, such as local history materials and intra-party 
materials. The findings of my research are reported and discussed in 
this article. 
The article is organised as follows: Beginning the paper with an 
outline of my theoretical framework on marginalisation, I then give 
some demographic background information on Henan Mongolian 
Autonomous County, focusing on its marginal status at the Sino-
Tibetan border. Next, I outline the history of the Henan grasslands, 
emphasising the Mongols’ efforts to maintain their “Mongolness” 
vis-à-vis the Tibetans (as a part of strategic self-marginalisation) and 
to break away from the Han Chinese throughout history. Later in the 
article, I reflect on the impact of the Chinese Ethnic Classification 
Project on Henan Mongols, paying particular attention to how they 
sometimes profit from their marginalised position. My aim here is to 
elucidate how Henan Mongols have used China’s “civilising” project 
to display their distinctiveness from Tibetans and from Han. The 
article concludes with a discussion on the dimensions of marginalisa-
tion. Overall, this article provides an empirical basis for a better under-
standing of the interaction between the centre and the periphery in 
the PRC, and the contention between state policy and ethno-
nationalism.  
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Demographic Information on Henan Mongolian 
Autonomous County 
Henan Mongols live in a marginalised position among the surround-
ing Amdo Tibetans. Henan County is located within the territory of 
the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (哴ই㯿᯿㠚⋫ᐎ,
Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou) in the southeastern part of Qinghai Prov-
ince, People’s Republic of China (PRC), at an average altitude of 
approximately 3,650 metres. Henan County is also known as “Malho” 
(Tib. rMa lho, “South of the Yellow River”), “Mengqi” (㫉ᰇ, Mongol 
banners), or “Sogpo” – in this context, meaning “Western Mongols” 
(Nag-dBan Blo-bZan rGya-mTSHo, translated by Zahiruddin 2008: 151). 
Henan County covers an area of 6,250 square kilometres. The county 
is embedded within the contemporary Tibetan autonomous prefec-
tures of western Gansu and eastern Qinghai. Today’s Henan County 
shares its eastern border with Xiahe County and Luqu County and its 
southeastern border with Maqu County, all within the Gannan Tibet-
an Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu Province. To the west, Henan 
County borders Maqin County, the Golok Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture, and Tongde County in Hainan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture in Qinghai. In the north it borders Zeku County in 
Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Referring to official 
statistics, in the surrounding areas 80 per cent of the population is 
Tibetan. Therefore, present-day Henan County can be seen as a 
“contact zone” (Pratt 1991) between Tibetan areas.  
In regard to the county’s population, according to several official 
Chinese sources on Henan County such as ⋣ই㫉ਔ᯿㠚⋫৯ᘇ 
(Henan Mengguzu zizhixian zhi, The Annals of Henan County), 哴⋣ই㫉
ਔᘇ (Huang Nan He Menggu zhi, The Annals of Henan Mongols), and ⋣
ই㫉ਔ᯿㠚⋫৯ᾲߥ (Henan Mengguzu zizhixian gaikuang, A Survey of 
Henan Mongolian Autonomous County), the majority population in the 
Henan grasslands was classified as Mongol in the course of the first 
census in 1954. Since the level of autonomy depends on the popula-
tion and the geographical size of a given region, many local Tibetans, 
such as the A rig (䱯Ḅ), agreed to be classified as Mongols, as, ac-
cording to my informants, the Mongol population of the Henan 
grasslands needed to reach about 90 per cent in order to obtain status 
as a “Mongol Autonomous Region.” Thus, this census created their 
classification, and many Tibetans became Mongolians (㫉ਔ᯿, Meng-
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HenanMongolian
AutonomousCounty
guzu) in a process Mullaney (2011: 101) calls “participant transfor-
mation” with the meaning of “setting the conditions under which 
these candidates came to ‘realize’ (seemingly on their own) the bonds 
they share with each other” (Mullaney 2011: 12). As a matter of fact, 
according to the first census conducted in 1954, 97.55 per cent of the 
Henan grasslands’ population was categorised as Mongol and only 
0.15 per cent as Tibetan.  
Figure 1. Henan Mongolian Autonomous County 
Source: Wikimedia 2007. 
Note: Light grey: Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. 
Especially since the 1950s, the Mongol inhabitants of Henan County 
have faced not only Tibetan influence but also Han Chinese domi-
nance. These two groups have had considerable effects on the local 
Mongols: Tibetans in terms of cultural, linguistic, social, and religious 
matters throughout history, and the Han Chinese through state power. 
The Chinese government, which controls economic and military pat-
terns, education, and communication, and furthermore, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), can be seen as the central force.  
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As I will show, Henan Mongols are neither “mainstream” Tibet-
ans nor “mainstream” Mongols; they are marginalised Mongols. He-
nan Mongols’ perception of marginality is both real and imagined, 
and they have learned how to take advantage of their marginalised 
position.  
Due to their isolation from their historical kin, throughout his-
tory it has been almost impossible for Henan Mongols to maintain 
cultural ties to other Mongol areas. As a result, the Mongolic groups 
in the Henan grasslands became isolated from other Mongolic groups 
(as a strategic choice) and due to the geographical proximity to Tibet-
an areas, these groups in the Henan grasslands became “tibetanised.” 
Reports on the precarious situation of the tibetanised Mongols living 
in Henan County, including the difficult multilingual situation, can be 
found in Ai Liman (2011), Hildegard Diemberger (2007), Li Anzhai 
(1994), Paul Nietupski (2013b), and Joseph Rock (1956). Neverthe-
less, it is unknown when the majority of Mongols in Henan lost their 
language and began speaking Tibetan. According to Henan Mengguzu 
zizhixian zhi (Editorial Board of the Committee of Henan Mongolian 
Autonomous County 1996, Vol. 1: 906, 909), Tibetan seems to have 
been spoken in the Henan grasslands since 1745, but no mention is 
made of when the Mongol language began to dwindle. At present, 
only a small population still speaks Oirad Mongolian or Sog skad 
(Birtalan 2003). Nevertheless, Henan Mongols still refer to their kin-
ship pattern, their “descendant group” or land, as well as to their 
organisation with the group. 
Historical Overview 
Since the sense of an independent history still plays a major part in 
sentiments of “Mongolness” in contemporary Henan County, it is 
necessary to outline the historical ethnic relations between Mongols, 
Tibetans, and Chinese in that area, which is important especially in 
determining cultural and ethnic meanings. Common useful infor-
mation about the history of Henan Mongolian Autonomous County 
is provided by Henan Mengguzu zizhixian zhi (The Annals of Henan Coun-
ty), Huang He Nan Menggu zhi (The Annals of Henan Mongols) and Henan 
Mengguzu zizhixian gaikuang (A Survey of Henan Mongolian Autonomous 
County); its history has also been dealt with elsewhere (Diemberger 
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2007; Dkon mchog skyabs 2009; Kesang Dargay 2007; Lce nag 
tshang Hum chen 2007; Shinjilt 2007; Dhondup 2002; Mi 1993).  
The first Mongol presence in present-day Henan County is at-
tested as early as the thirteenth century, although it left hardly any 
evident cultural traces. In fact, the origin of the Mongol inhabitants 
of Henan County can be traced back to Gushri Khan (1582–1655), 
leader of the Khoshut Mongols, one of the four major tribes of Oi-
rads (Western Mongols), who settled down among local Tibetans in 
the region during the seventeenth century. To maintain their auton-
omy, it can be stated that throughout their history Henan Mongols 
have tried to maintain a distance from their Tibetan surroundings and 
performed counter-actions, as the Qing administrative structures 
existed side by side with, and independent from, the Mongol banners 
(Khan 1996: 130). Gushri Khan set up a “buffer zone” between the 
civilising missions from China and those from Tibet. Since he re-
ceived recognition from the Qing and the right to offer tribute, it can 
be stated that Gushri Khan and his localised political power – despite 
the hegemony of the Khoshut Mongols across the northern Tibetan 
plateau from 1637 until 1723 (Uyungbilig Borjigidai 2002) – already 
supported the recognition of China’s centricity. During that period of 
time, the Mongolic groups of the Henan grasslands lived at the mar-
gins of both the Tibetan empire and the Qing empire, separated from 
other Mongolic groups of Inner and Central Asia while maintaining 
strong contact with the Dzungars (Perdue 2005). In fact, the Khoshut 
realm was the passage linking China to Tibet where external and in-
ternal actors interacted and mixed and were separated and divided.  
After Lobjang Danjin’s Rebellion in 1723 (Kato 1993, 2004, 
2013; Soloshcheva 2014), the Mongolic groups of the Henan grass-
lands were officially integrated into the Qing empire, and administra-
tive power and succession were managed locally due to the geograph-
ical remoteness of the area. Moreover, the pasturelands and the people 
were subdivided into administrative units according to a hierarchical 
system, and the banner system (ᰇ, qi) was established with a qinwang  
(Ӣ⦻), Prince of the First Order, as its ruler. The qinwang were a pol-
itical authority in that area, and through processes of standardisation 
they likely had a profound impact on local cultural patterns. They 
undoubtedly brought the Oirad language, yurts, and distinctive dress 
styles into the Henan grasslands. Concurrently, Mongol culture was 
being confronted with and integrated into the dominant Tibetan cul-
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ture. And furthermore, Tibetans and Mongols became mixed. After 
1723, during the reign of the first Henan Mengqi qinwang (⋣ই㫉ᰇӢ
⦻), Prince of Henan Mongol Banners, Cahan Danjin (ሏ㖅ѩ⍕, 
Tshe dbang bstan ‘dzin) (1670–1735), who ruled the four banners of 
the Henan grasslands, elements of Oirad culture started to influence 
the grasslands. Additionally, Mongol power became more significant 
throughout all of Amdo; as early as 1709, Prince Cahan Danjin of-
fered his land to Jamyang Shapa (’Jam dbyangs shad pa) to build the 
Gelug Buddhist monastery in Labrang (᣹ঌᾎሪ, Labuleng Si, bLa 
brang bkra shis ‘khyil) in what is now Gansu Province. From that 
time on, the Mongols, especially the Henan princes, supported local 
Gelukpa monastic institutions and the Gelukpa became the standard-
ised cultural line for Henan Mongols. Ai Liman (2009: 5) argues that 
the close connection of the Henan grasslands to the Labrang monas-
tery played a major role in the “tibetanisation” of Mongols – initially 
in terms of the Tibetan language due to monastic education as well as 
the adoption of Tibetan cultural traits including diet and clothing. 
Furthermore, the adoption of Buddhism was not an effort directed 
by the central Qing authority but rather a strong ideological force and 
an action of local nobles engaged in collaborative formation at the 
margins of the Qing empire. In fact, monks appointed the headmen 
of local tribes (Pirie 2005). The Henan qinwang continued to appoint 
the headmen of the Mongol tribes, and at the same time he was the 
chief lay patron of the Labrang monastery. The Oirad Mongols were 
constructing a cultural identity, asserting key values, defining new 
relationships, and building new cultural boundaries. In this context, 
their self-marginalisation can be seen as a way they have maintained 
their autonomy.  
As a matter of fact, after the rebellion in 1723 the mobility of the 
Tibetan and Mongolian pastoralists was reduced, and with the subse-
quent emergence of territorial boundaries and administrative units, 
both the Tibetan and the Mongol patriarchal clans “officially” disap-
peared as a political entity (even though they are still present today). 
In regard to the Henan grasslands, Mongol and Tibetan pastoralists 
had to decide whether to migrate or to remain and accept the new 
structures, not as a unified ethnicity but unified politically at the mar-
gins of the Qing (Manchu) empire.  
According to my local informants, “outside” cultures and ethni-
cities strengthened the sense of “Mongolness” among the Henan 
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grasslands’ population. With the fall of the Qing dynasty and the 
founding of the Republic of China in 1912, the Muslim Ma warlords 
(Lipman 1984, 1997) gained power in that region. The Henan grass-
lands were a relatively independent political entity since the Mongol 
qinwang and other tribal leaders were powerful players in mobilising 
economic and military resources. In the course of that, the Henan 
qinwang maintained Henan’s autonomy against the Ma warlords, but at 
the same time the qinwang exercised political alliances with the Chi-
nese, the Muslims, and the Tibetan chieftains (൏ਨ, tusi) of Labrang 
(see Herman 2006). Samuel (1993: 96) suggests that power in the 
region was exercised through a series of alliances and overlapping 
spheres of military power and religious and political influence. After 
the Guomindang (ഭ≁ފ, Kuomintang, KMT) gained power in 1928, 
Qinghai Province was incorporated into the Republic of China. After 
the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, only some borders 
shifted slightly, and the Henan grasslands came under the control of 
the CCP.  
The last qinwang, Tashi Tsering (bKra shis Tshe ring, ᡾ௌ᡽䇙 or 
᡾㾯᡽䇙 ), also called the “Mongol Queen,” who ascended the 
throne as the tenth qinwang in 1940, welcomed the CCP as a repre-
sentative of the traditional local elite (regarding this topic, see Weiner 
2012). Under her leadership, the “Mongolian kingdom” was trans-
formed into the Henan Mongolian Autonomous Region (⋣ই㫉ਔ᯿
㠚⋫४, Henan Mengguzu Zizhiqu) in 1954. Since the CCP policy pro-
moted differentiated political treatment of the main minority nation-
alities (Manchu, Mongolian, Muslim, Tibetan), the CCP actually al-
lowed a certain degree of autonomy and postponed socialist reforms 
in the areas inhabited by these minority nationalities (Dhondup 2002: 
228). Furthermore, the CCP approved local autonomy with the aim 
of uniting all peoples within the Communist regime, since the party 
initially relied on the traditional leadership, though it vested those 
traditional leaders with very little decision-making power. At that 
time, Tashi Tsering was positioned as a symbol of her nationality with 
the framework of the Chinese state (Dhondup and Diemberger 2002: 
197). But in fact, administrative and religious systems were over-
thrown; secular leaders lost their authority as the formally formed, 
nomadic pastoralists’ segmentary tribal groups and the local struc-
tures were replaced by the collective or the cadres. Former local lead-
ers were excluded from political participation, and they were unable 
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to exercise any significant legislative or administrative powers, despite 
the fact that the protection of political, economic, and social elements 
existed, and still exists, in domestic PRC law, though its implementa-
tion is a different matter. The initial period of CCP control involved 
considerable efforts to empower local populations to be “masters in 
their own homes” (rather than to marginalise them). Despite her 
region having autonomous status, Tashi Tsering was not able to exer-
cise significant self-governance due to China’s centricity, though the 
Chinese state tried to incorporate pastoral peripheries into the state’s 
political, educational, economic, and welfare systems (Klotzbücher et 
al. 2012). With the lack of participation in decision-making politics, 
the marginalisation of Henan Mongols began around 1958. The Chi-
nese government sought to control and develop its pastoral peripher-
ies, because the CCP claimed the pastoralist lifestyle was inadequately 
equipped for modernisation or “civilisation” since pastoralists were 
characterised as economically “backward” (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and 
Klotzbücher 2014). Consequently, in order to integrate those pastor-
alists at the periphery into the state, the Chinese state has caused the 
peoples at the peripheries to settle (Scott 2009).  
In 1964, the Henan Mongolian Autonomous Region was trans-
formed into Henan Mongolian Autonomous County (⋣ই㫉ਔ᯿㠚
⋫৯, Henan Mengguzu Zizhixian). The creation of autonomous regions 
is one of the results of the “civilising projects” to bring the peripheral 
leaders into the party-state apparatus (Harrell 1995). By that time, the 
territories of the local six tribes (䜘㩭, buluo) were transformed into 
the six communities (ґ , xiang) of contemporary Henan County, 
which reflect the ancient administrative structure: Be si che chung 
(ཆᯟ, Wai si) became Khu sin (થ⭏ґ, Kesheng xiang); gTsang A rig 
(㯿䱯Ḅ, Zang A rou) became Nyin mtha (ᆱᵘ⢩ґ , Ningmute 
xiang); Su rug che chung (ᯟḄ⩬૷, Si rou qiong wa) became Brag 
dmar (Ոᒢᆱ䭷, Youganning zhen); Kha gsum tsho hor (঑ᶮᵘ, Ka 
song mu) became mTho yul ma (ᢈਦ⧋ґ, Tuoyema xiang); mDa’ 
tshan Ho zhod (䗮৲, Da can) became gSer lung (䎋ቄ嗉ґ , 
Sai’erlong xiang); and Thu med thor gud (൏唈⢩, Tu mo te) became 
mDo gsum (ཊᶮґ, Duosong xiang). 
In the course of several further reforms, there were some clashes 
between the Mongols and the CCP. In fact, those revolts were mainly 
led by the chieftains of the former four banners. Henan Mongols 
positioned themselves against the state but also against the Tibetans 
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in order to emphasise and retain their Mongolian identity. In the 
course of recent history, the last “Mongol Queen,” Tashi Tsering, has 
even become the local “ethnic hero” of Henan Mongols, and the 
presentation of her ethnic identity can be interpreted as her political 
positioning. Her imprints can still be found all over the Henan grass-
lands and Labrang: her “royal palace” in Labrang, her picture on the 
walls of many households, and her biography in bookshelves. During 
her reign, she herself shared her values with the Mongol ethnic group 
and represented her nationality vis-à-vis the Chinese state. At least at 
the beginning she was respected, and used, by the Communists. But 
in 1966, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, Tashi Tsering be-
came a target as the representative of the “old four.” After her death 
in 1966, the circumstances around which are still unclear, her family 
fled to a nomadic lifestyle in order to escape the state. Hence, in this 
context I apply Jean Michaud’s (2006: 180) definition of nomadism as 
“an escape or survival strategy,” related to James Scott’s (2009) 
framework on borderlands, sites of escape and flight from the state. I 
argue that Henan Mongols have been more or less able to position 
themselves outside the decision-making power of the Chinese state 
and still maintain their traditional local decision-making power, at 
least in regard to local nomadic pastoralist issues, since the tribal 
leaders and lamas have the power to enforce peaceful behaviour with-
in the local groups. In fact, pastoralists use the power of the govern-
ment for their own purposes: they take advantage of their specific 
societal framework, they differentiate between their relation to the 
tribe and to the state, and they even shift their ethnic identity accord-
ing to their needs and convenience. Henan grassland pastoralists are 
loyal to their tribe and demonstrate respect for lamas, spiritual leaders 
seen as religious authorities. 
Alongside Tashi Tsering, the monasteries, the tribal leaders, and 
the village leaders still enjoy high prestige among Henan Mongols. In 
regard to fights over pasturelands, for instance, the government rarely 
interferes; instead, dispute resolution is left to tribal leaders and the 
monastery (Pirie 2005; Shinjilt 2007) as there has been violence con-
cerning pasture claims since well before the CCP’s arrival in the 
1950s. It must be mentioned that it is absolutely essential for the 
former tribe leaders to officially join the Party before they can be-
come township or village chiefs. Pirie (2005: 23) describes pastoral-
ists’ complaints to her that the authorities could and should do more 
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to control violence, but at the same time they view the Chinese sys-
tem of criminal punishment as inadequate for settling disputes. Con-
sequently, pastoralists reject the legitimacy of the government’s pun-
ishments since, in their view, these punishments contravene minority 
rights regarding the preservation of traditional communal life. During 
my stays and visits in the field, several pastoralists told me that the 
government does not dare to interfere since government officials are 
afraid of the “wild pastoralists” and because they also strive to avoid 
political (ethnic) conflicts in those areas. Therefore, the government 
prefers to stay out of “smaller” issues such as fights over pasture-
lands. Most importantly, locals heed religious and tribal leaders’ rul-
ings over governmental decisions; overall, pasture used to be inter-
preted as “non-state space” by pastoralists.  
The Ethnic Classification Project (1950–1980) 
It is fairly difficult to distinguish between Mongol and Tibetan pas-
toralists. Throughout history, various Mongolic groups immigrated to 
the Tibetan plateau; the Henan grasslands saw the arrival of the 
Torgud, Coros, and Khoid during the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), 
followed by the Ordos, Dörvöd, and Tümed during the sixteenth 
century, and the Khoshut in the seventeenth century. In the course of 
their migration, the various Mongolic groups were socialised by the 
Tibetan environment due to their geographical isolation from their 
historical kin. Hildegard Diemberger (2002: 173) states that “Tibetan 
and Mongol ethnicity is clearly rather a recent construct,” which Toni 
Huber supports with his finding that “it is now difficult to discern 
their original non-Tibetan ethnicity” (2002: XV). 
The Republican concept of Zhonghua minzu (ѝॾ≁᯿, “Chinese 
nation” or “Chinese people”) – actually a mosaic of distinct minzu (≁
᯿) – was advocated by Sun Yatsen (1866–1925) after the Chinese 
revolution of 1911. The term “minzu” is taken from the Japanese 
term minzoku (≁᯿), which means “ethnic group,” “nation,” “race,” 
or even any combination of these. Hence, minzu indicates both na-
tionalities and the nation as such – though, in this research context, 
the term minzu is translated as either “nationality” or “ethnic group,” 
depending on its socio-political context. People who lived on Chinese 
territory in 1911 became a part of the Chinese people: aside from the 
“Five Peoples of China” (ӄ᯿ޡ઼, wuzu gonghe) – Han (≹), Man (┑, 
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Manchu), Meng (㫉, Mongols), Zang (㯿, Tibetans), and Hui (എ, 
including all Muslims in China) (Mullaney 2011: 25) – other groups 
existed outside that classification; these groups were simply called 
“tribes.” However, even during the Republican Era, Tibetans and 
Mongols explicitly distinguished themselves from each other – 
though, in terms of the various Mongolic groups, Khan states that  
there is no such […] category as the Mongol community or na-
tion, but rather various local groups, whom the Chinese conveni-
ently referred to as Mongols. (Khan 1995: 251) 
After the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao 
Zedong initiated the “Ethnic Classification Project” (≁᯿䇶࡛ᐕ֌, 
minzu shibie gongzuo) (1950–1980), which Stevan Harrell (1995) refers 
to as the Communists’ “civilising project” among its frontier minori-
ties, who were actually marginalised as backward minorities (Giersch 
2006). However, official minzu were created by the central govern-
ment to shape the structure of society and identity within the PRC 
(Mullaney 2011) before the state integrated these various peoples 
within the Chinese political system on the principle of “unity in di-
versity” (ཊݳаփ, duoyuan yiti). The classification itself was a unique-
ly PRC enterprise based on the Stalinist concept of natsia – the Soviet 
definition of nationality. China’s various ethnic groups were classified 
as minzu, according to a common language, a common territory, a 
common economic life, and a common physiological make-up, later 
known as common “culture” (Mackerras 1990: 141). In 1987 the 
central authorities announced the end of the national ethnic classifica-
tion project, thereby indicating that out of the preliminary 400 regis-
tered ethnic groups, the figure of 56 minzu was henceforth definitive 
and non-modifiable (38 minzu had been recognised by 1953; by 1964 
this number had risen to 53). The 56 minzu were fixed in 1980, and 
the “unidentified” ones were placed under the umbrella of other eth-
nic groups. Some minzu are scattered all over China, some are quali-
fied for non-Chinese identity by virtue of distinct historical and cul-
tural features (Bulag 2002: 19). The various “unified” minzu were 
created by China’s central government. As a matter of fact, Han be-
came the official majority, whereas the other 55 ethnic groups were 
the “minority nationalities” or, as Mullaney (2011: 1) claims, “ethno-
national groups.” The Han had reached an advanced position and the 
minority nationalities were located at backward stages of social devel-
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opment compared to the superiority of “Chinese” culture; conse-
quently, they face social and economic exclusion as a fact of daily life. 
China is a multi-ethnic society, but not a state of multiple na-
tions. As a result of the Ethnic Classification Project, a person’s clas-
sification has been marked on their personal identification card (䓛ԭ
䇱, shenfen zheng) as well as displayed on all official documents (Glad-
ney 2004) since the 1980s. This project has caused conflicts with the 
ethnic groups’ self-perception since individuals have had to identify 
themselves as members of one particular group. Hence, many people 
are still negotiating their classification (the new law “Measures for the 
Administration of the Ethnic Composition Registration of Chinese 
Citizens” (ѝഭޜ≁≁᯿ᡀԭⲫ䇠㇑⨶࣎⌅, Zhongguo gongmin minzu 
chengfen dengji guanli banfa), which says that citizens have the opportuni-
ty for the first and only time in their lives to reclassify themselves 
within two years of their eighteenth birthday, was implemented as of 
1 January 2016). It should be explicitly mentioned that among the 
same (ethnic) group, not all people hold the same view of their identi-
ty. Henan Mongols were willing to go along with the classification 
provided by the state, although among themselves they are aware of 
how they differ from each other and in what ways they are similar to 
other Mongols or Tibetans. But especially in the Tibetan and Mongo-
lian context, ethnicity is more salient than it is among “better-inte-
grated” minority nationalities such as the Zhuang. Especially in terms 
of Henan Mongols, according to my informants, group membership 
plays an important role, alongside their ethnic consciousness, due to 
their loyalty to the tribal leaders or lamas. But as a matter of fact, this 
kind of group membership is not displayed on any official docu-
ments.  
The Ethnic Classification Project presented a chance for Henan 
Mongols – and other ethnic groups – to break away from the Hans 
(and from the Tibetans). Through their classification as Mongols 
within the Tibetan cultural area of Amdo, they use their ethnic mar-
ginality to construct distinctiveness. The inhabitants of Henan Coun-
ty have been classified based on their historical records and their 
genealogy – though the historical kinship might have been overval-
ued, but not according to the Soviet model. According to my inform-
ants, most members of Henan’s Mongolic groups state that according 
to their “bones” (Tib. rus) they might be Mongols, but according to 
the language they are Tibetans; it is most important for them to not 
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be seen or classified as “Han Chinese.” Since the 1980s, the local 
government of Henan County has supported locals registering them-
selves and their descendants as Mongols to sustain their particular 
status as a “Mongol Autonomous County” among surrounding Ti-
betan areas. Yet at the same time, being classified as Mongol in the 
Henan grasslands means being a minority within the Tibetan cultural 
area of Amdo. In fact, in the course of history, Henan Mongolic 
groups have been largely assimilated and integrated into their Tibetan 
“host” culture. 
The pastoralists of the Henan grasslands have been called 
“Mongols” by others, which may also explain the willingness among 
the Mongolic and Tibetan populations to accept the Mongol label in 
the course of the classification process. At least in the beginning, for 
most people, their official minzu status according to their identity 
cards had hardly any meaning due to their lack of knowledge of the 
state’s conceptualisation of the term “ethnic classification.” Some of 
my older informants stated that they learned about the concept of 
minzu in school textbooks, but that it has no relevance in their every-
day lives. In fact, before the Communist “liberation,” the inhabitants 
of contemporary Henan County – as I mentioned before – identified 
themselves according to kinship, tribal affiliation, locality, and reli-
gious grouping. As a collective, they all belong to the “Mongol ban-
ners,” and neither a “pure” consanguinity nor knowledge of the 
Mongolian language is an absolute requirement for being Mongol. As 
Almaz Khan (1995: 269) argued, “the general ideas of being a Mon-
gol have moved from the physical to the ideational and imaginative.” 
In fact, the family genealogies cannot always been traced back, and 
therefore the classification is contextualised by needs and interests. 
Dhondup and Diemberger (2002: 116) explain the seeming arbitrari-
ness of ethnic classification by demonstrating how Tashi Tsering 
represented “Mongolness” though she never spoke Mongolian and 
she was half-Tibetan. Since her husband was Tibetan, two of their 
children are now officially registered as Tibetans and the other two 
children are officially registered as Mongols. Hence, the children 
show their loyalty to Mongols as well to Tibetans. Another family 
story I came across during one of my numerous stays in Henan 
County told of a family with eight descendants, some of whose iden-
tity cards said “Tibetan” and some “Mongol.” Now, they say they are 
better able to take advantage of their classifications, though none of 
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them could (or wanted to) tell me why they classified themselves as 
Tibetan or Mongol. In the course of several conversations with them 
since the late 1990s, the only story they all revealed to me was that 
their father’s family originally came from what is now the Aba Tibet-
an and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan and later moved to 
Henan County, the place where their mother was born. In fact, this is 
just one case of intermarriage and the mixing of ethnic groups in 
Henan County. The seeming arbitrariness of ethnic classification was 
explained to me based on the example of two brothers: In the 1980s, 
one brother went to school in Rebkong (਼ӱ, Tongren), the capital 
of Huangnan Prefecture, and because of his place of residence he was 
classified as Tibetan; whereas his second eldest brother, who at that 
time was studying at the Northwest Nationality College in Lanzhou, 
was classified as Mongol because of his birthplace in Henan County. 
In the course of economic development, being categorised as a mi-
nority nationality nowadays seems advantageous in terms of econom-
ic and financial prospects: for example, the youngest of the eight 
descendants from the story above received a prestigious governmen-
tal job in Henan County due to his “Mongolness.” Aside from getting 
governmental jobs, another advantage of being classified as Mongol 
is the higher chance of getting a passport, which has become a nearly 
impossible undertaking for Tibetans recently (especially since 2008).  
According to one of my informants in 2014, only since the Ti-
betan uprisings of 2008 and the self-immolations by Tibetans since 
February 2009 have “mongolised” Tibetans been eager to strengthen 
their awareness of their Tibetan origins. My informant expressly de-
clared that in times such as today, Mongols and Tibetans need to be 
aware of the two cultures’ distinctive identities: Tibetan activists pos-
tulate that the self-immolations not only show growing desperation 
over what the protesters see as the marginalisation of Tibetan culture 
and religion under Chinese rule, but can also be interpreted as identi-
ty-based movements. They demand the opportunity to practise their 
religion and to learn their own history. Tibetans are known for their 
uncompromising desire for autonomy, a major source of tension 
between Tibetans and Mongols. At the same time, some of my He-
nan Mongol informants complained about Tibetan “ingratitude” 
towards the state. Furthermore, I was told that Tibetans were less 
“loyal” than Mongols. In fact, Henan Mongols consciously place 
themselves at the margins to achieve political and economic benefits.  
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The Mongolic groups of the Henan grasslands are faced with 
patterns of representation, production, and history. As Yangdon 
Dhondup (2002: 226) states, the “Mongolian ethnic group [in Henan 
County] became assimilated into Tibetan culture, and they later re-
defined and/or re-invented themselves through state-sponsored pol-
icies as Mongolians.”  
“Civilising Projects” 
Since Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “opening up,” the Mongols of He-
nan County have benefitted from a certain degree of liberalisation on 
cultural and economic levels due to their “gratefulness” towards the 
centralised state. And at the same time, the state found its way into 
local, everyday life.  
During the reforms under Deng Xiaoping, local traditions and 
customs were revived, and the re-definition of ethnic identity through 
state-sponsored policies has been propagated by the state since the 
1980s. Furthermore, successive Chinese governments have sought to 
“civilise” China’s ethnic minorities. The effect of this “civilising pro-
ject” (Harrell 1995) was to develop, sharpen, and heighten the con-
sciousness of the peripheral people as an ethnic group. In the course 
of that project, “the consciousness that a people exists as an entity 
that differs from surrounding peoples” (Harrell 1995: 7) was devel-
oped. The first step was the reconstruction of local histories in the 
mid-1980s to show the connection to the state apparatus, followed by 
the promotion of ethnic-minority cultures (Mackerras 1990: 25–28), 
such as through the revival of traditional festivals.  
Henan Mongols’ marginality is used to attract the attention of 
“outsiders,” especially to promote the development of tourism in that 
area: a civilising project as a form of de-marginalisation. In the course 
of this “Ethnic Revival Propaganda,” the traditional Naadam (䛓䗮
ᒅ) Festival (three-day Mongol sports festival) was – according to 
several of my informants – re-implemented in 1984 (though Diem-
berger [2007] shows that it had previously never been held in this 
region). Much to my surprise, it is regulated to take place every year 
starting on 1 August, the anniversary of the founding of the People’s 
Liberation Army. According to my sources, this specific date was 
chosen so that the Naadam Festival would fit into the Chinese state’s 
celebration calendar. Referring to some of my informants, such a 
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festival did exist before the Communist era, though not under the 
Mongolian name “Naadam”; according to one of my informants, it 
was known as “dga’ ston” (?), whereas Diemberger’s (2007: 118) in-
formants said that the festival used to be called shenlong (Tib. shing 
long). Some aspects of local culture have not completely been “mon-
golised” by the Chinese government but revived. “Ethnic” festivals 
can be used for political meetings as well as for political propaganda, 
and can be commodified more easily than any other aspect of Mon-
gol culture for tourism. Moreover, this officially propagated opening-
up policy leads towards assimilation into the mainstream modern 
culture. In Mongolia, the festival is carried out by the government to 
promote national pride and self-confidence; in regard to Henan 
County, it might be to celebrate Mongolian cultural identity within 
the surrounding Tibetan areas, and to officially acknowledge their 
Mongolian roots, thereby reaffirming the state category of “Mongol-
ness.” The distinctive features between Henan’s Naadam and Mon-
golia’s Naadam are the use of three traditional Mongolian sport dis-
ciplines which formed the pastoralists’ life: wrestling, archery, and 
horse racing, whereby archery has been replaced in Henan by weight-
lifting, since in the Amdo area archery competitions can only be 
found in farming areas but not in pastoralist areas. However, Naadam 
is a political statement that not only shows Henan Mongols’ incor-
poration into the central government’s administration, but also advo-
cates their “Mongolness” and their distinction from their Tibetan 
neighbours. The reforming and reviving of ethnic tradition is an inte-
gral part of China’s “ethnic revival propaganda” and a construct of 
the imagination of national identity in terms of the Chinese nation.  
Another state-sponsored project has long been education, espe-
cially minority-language education, even though access to quality 
education is still unequal at present. Henan County is a pastoralist 
area, and children are required to help at home. But since in remote 
areas children have to stay in residential schools, many pastoralist 
families cannot meet their basic survival needs. Consequently, pastor-
alists are dissuaded from participating in education. According to the 
records (Henanxian zhi, ⋣ই৯ᘇ), 90 per cent of the population of 
the Henan grasslands was illiterate before the Communist “libera-
tion,” because there were no schools (according to several inform-
ants, home-schooling used to exist, as did education for men in the 
monasteries). 
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With the arrival of the CCP in the Henan grasslands, education 
was used as an important vehicle for conveying the values and beliefs 
of the new system. In the early years, Tibetan was the medium lan-
guage, and Chinese was taught as the second language. The language 
shift to Tibetan started in 1949 when, as Dkon mchog skyabs de-
scribes, as quoted in Roche (2015),  
the village of Chu kha ma, in rNga ba, fled from a dispute with the 
dMe king [of rNga ba] and settled in Be si che Village, where they 
mixed with local people and began influencing them to speak Ti-
betan. (Dkon mchog skyabs 2009: 29) 
As a follow-up to that quotation, Roche writes,  
This language shift was accelerated from 1958 on, when the use of 
Oirad (Mongol) was forbidden: locals were forced to speak Tibet-
an, and Oirad-speaking communities were broken up and their 
populations scattered throughout Henan. (Roche 2015: 5–6)  
With the state-sponsored revival of Mongol identity in the 1980s, the 
first Mongolian-medium school (㫉᮷ᆖṑ , Mengwen xuexiao) was 
opened in 1985 as an attempt to use education to transmit traditional 
Mongolian culture more efficiently. Furthermore, by highlighting the 
significance of ethnic-minority languages, the state and the local gov-
ernments were striving for national ethnic integration. In the public 
education sector, the Chinese curriculum is followed, with Chinese 
textbooks simply being translated into the minority language (Ma 
2007; Kolas 2005), but specific ethnic and cultural or even intercul-
tural features are not included.  
Henan County invited Mongolian-language teachers from Haixi 
Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture as a preliminary 
measure to ensure all teachers in every primary school were fluent in 
the medium language. Later on, in January 1990, a new law stipulated 
that Mongolian be taught not only in primary school but also in high 
schools; in July of the same year, the first primary school students 
graduated from the Mongolian-language class (㫉᮷⨝, Mengwen ban) 
and continued their studies in the Mongolian-medium high school, 
from which 19 graduated in 1993 (Ai 2011; Sarenna 2013). From 
local discourse, the majority of students who graduated from the 
Mongolian-medium programme faced difficulties in finding jobs later 
on in their “tibetanised” community or in other places within the 
PRC. Another difficulty of the minority-language education was the 
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limited range of higher-education opportunities, since the Chinese 
language became the lingua franca (਼⭘䈝䀰, tongyong yuyan) as well as 
the interethnic common language (᯿䱵ޡ਼䈝, zuji gongtong yu) within 
the PRC.  
According to Sarenna (2013), the last five students of the Mon-
golian-medium programme graduated in 2002, and given the prob-
lems with the practical value of the language, Mongolian-medium 
classes were discontinued. Those educated in Mongolian were socially 
excluded, since Chinese and Tibetan were, and still are, the dominant 
languages in Henan County, and Mongolian was and is still rarely 
used in local society. Regarding their choice of school, although stu-
dents take into consideration their cultural and ancestral background, 
they tend to give priority to the school that will ensure the best eco-
nomic and job prospects down the line. In regard to the education 
system, due to China’s civilising mission in minority areas, intercul-
tural understanding is neglected: Chinese language and Chinese cul-
ture are promoted despite the fact that according to the law, bilingual 
education and minority languages should be promoted. Simultaneous-
ly, people who lack fluency in Chinese experience higher levels of job 
discrimination, which in turn leads to social and economic exclusion 
within the state. Therefore, according to my informants, most parents 
send their children to the Chinese school, since they do not want 
their children to be socially and economically excluded. In regard to 
education in a minority language – whether Tibetan or Mongolian – 
employment possibilities are limited. Subsequently, the lack of access 
to work following minority-language education leads to impoverish-
ment.  
Officially, to prevent impoverishment, to develop Henan Coun-
ty’s economy, and in the name of national unity (≁᯿ഒ㔃, minzu 
tuanjie), Tianjin Binghai jucheng touzi gongsi (ཙ⍕┘⎧㚊ᡀᣅ䍴 ޜਨ), a 
Chinese mineral water company from Tianjin opened a branch in 
mTho yul ma (Tuoyema xiang) in 2011. Its business idea complies 
with the objectives of the Western Development Programme (㾯䜘བྷ
ᔰਁ, xibu dakaifa) of bringing social progress, economic growth, and 
prosperity to the people in the “backward” region by using local re-
sources such as the spring water from the plateau (see <www.jing 
duwater.com>). The mineral water produced is not sold locally but in 
big Chinese cities since locally there is no ready market due its rela-
tively high price. The company’s employees at the management level 
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are Han Chinese from Chinese coastal cities, whereas the workers are 
young local pastoralists. At the very beginning of their employment, 
the locals are required to attend company-internal courses allegedly 
because, according to one of my Han informants, “locals have no 
culture and need to become civilised”. The first thing the courses 
require is the knowledge of Chinese, as it is the working language of 
the company. Aside from Chinese-language classes, the courses with-
in the scope of this “civilising mission” cover political education, 
national unity, hygiene, and nutrition – a process whereby the local 
employees become “Chinese” in a cultural and political sense.  
In order to pursue a better cultural and economic life and to 
prevent the impoverishment of illiterates, two local women’s organi-
sations for the manufacturing of traditional Mongolian and Tibetan 
handicrafts were established during the last two years, even though 
minority nationalities have limited input in the state-driven develop-
ment model. The two institutions are Lelema zangmeng tese 
shougong zhipin kaifa youxian gongsi (ҀҀ⧋㫉㯿⢩㢢᡻ᐕࡦ૱ᔰਁ
ᴹ䲀ޜਨ, Handmade Mongolian and Tibetan Traditional Handicraft 
Corporation) and Henan Xian Anjiang Zang Meng fuzhuang zhizuo 
gongsi (⋣ই৯ᆹ⊏㯿㫉ᴽ㻵ࡦ֌ޜਨ, Henan County Anjiang Tibet-
an Mongolian Clothing Company). Both companies produce and sell 
traditional Mongol clothing and a variety of products made of felt; 
this gives the sedentarised, illiterate, local pastoralist women a job 
opportunity, and it also helps to bring traditional handicraft back into 
use. The pastoralist women perceive this as a sign of the revival of 
women’s power among marginalised settled pastoralists.  
Aside from festivals and language, other cultural aspects have re-
ceived attention due to the impact of globalisation, larger communi-
cation networks, and tourism. Slowly but steadily, Henan Mongols 
are rediscovering an affinity with their cultural roots as a way to show 
the distinction between Mongols and Tibetans. To develop Mongol 
culture and to transmit the knowledge of their own culture and tradi-
tion, in the last few years the Association for the Rescue of Henan’s 
Mongol Culture and History (哴⋣ই㫉ਔশਢ᮷ॆᣒᮁՐ᢯ॿՊ, 
Huanghenan Mengu lishi wenhua qiangjiu zhuancheng xiehui; Tib. 
rMa lho sog po’i skad yig myur skyob mthun tshogs) was founded by 
locals. Members of this association are laypeople and monks, pastor-
alists and academics, men and women. Some of my informants are 
members of this association, and they told me independently of each 
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other that the language is the “soul” (Tib. bla) of their ethnic identity, 
their spiritual heritage (see Gayley 2011). Seeing the preservation of 
their Mongol (Oirad) language as their duty, they frequently organise 
Mongolian language competitions (⋣ই㫉ᰇ⇽䈝ਓ䈝∄䎋, Henan 
Mengqi muyu kouyu bisai); for example, they held a three-day language 
competition for all of Henan County in January 2015, another one in 
May, and another in September, for which any local interested in 
Mongolian language was invited to register. The fourth language 
competition (㘳䈅∄䎋, kaoshi bisai) took place on 13 December 2015. 
Information on these competitions is mainly disseminated through 
WeChat (ᗞؑ), a Chinese social media network.  
Their distinctiveness from Tibetans has turned into business ideas 
for Mongols. Three Mongol culture shops in Brag dmar (Youganning 
Township) have opened, selling traditional Mongol costumes, shoes, 
and housewares made in Inner Mongolia. The first shop was opened 
in 2009 by a Mongolian from Haixi Prefecture. Spurred by newly 
established consumer practices and tourism, a Mongolian family from 
Khu sin (Kesheng xiang) opened another shop in 2012. Banking on 
good business for the 60th anniversary of the founding of Henan 
Autonomous County, in early 2014 a third Mongol shop was opened 
by a local family. Being Mongol was and still is associated with high 
prestige, due to their ancestral hero Genghis Khan, portraits of 
whom are displayed throughout the shops. In Henan County, Gen-
ghis Khan serves as a “specific symbol of ethnic/cultural survival […] 
in relation to the overwhelmingly dominant Chinese state and soci-
ety” (Khan 1995: 248) as well as in relation to the dominant Tibetan 
culture. It may represent the attempt to construct a new Mongol 
identity based on state-sponsored historical narratives.  
The most visible state-sponsored “civilising” project (in terms of 
cultural standardisation) was the renovation of the township for the 
60th anniversary of the founding of Henan Mongolian Autonomous 
County in August 2014: the main street of Brag dmar (Youganning 
Township) received a complete makeover in “mongolesque” style 
(Roche and Lha mo sgrol ma 2014: 39) with its extensive use of the 
colour blue. For Mongols, the traditional colour blue represents the 
sky and signifies eternity. The roofs of most buildings on the main 
street now resemble the Mongol yurt; a traditional Mongol pastoralist 
lifestyle has been adapted to a Chinese sedentary lifestyle. Further-
more, most of the streets of the township, which is the county seat, 
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were given names that were then displayed on quadrilingual street 
signs in Mongolian, Tibetan, Chinese, and English. All street names 
refer to the Henan grasslands’ Mongol history, such as Khoshut 
Road, Tumed Road, and Cahan Danjin Road. Yet, when one asks 
locals about street names, nobody knows them. Streets and street 
names as well as the settlements are the result of China’s civilising 
project. 
While the Chinese state seeks to control and develop the pastoral 
periphery of the Henan grasslands, the Henan Mongols, at the same 
time, are using the “civilising” projects as well as the “mongolisation” 
schemes towards their own ends. At least to some extent, these vari-
ous projects have contributed to the revival of ethnic consciousness 
among Mongols, especially in terms of their differentiating them-
selves from the surrounding Tibetans. Actually, as the cultural, reli-
gious, and linguistic values of Henan Mongols are similar to Tibetan 
values, the main divergence is the Mongols’ belief in their “mytholo-
gised Mongol conqueror” (Khan 2005: 248): Genghis Khan, who is 
also seen as a “national hero” for China since, according to new nar-
ratives, Genghis Khan was also Chinese.  
Conclusion 
The various ways in which Henan Mongols are marginalised can be 
traced back to their topological, demographic, ecologic, cultural, and 
linguistic conditions. Contemporary Henan Mongolian Autonomous 
County is situated at the periphery of both Greater Tibet and the 
Chinese state – that is to say, at the Sino-Tibetan borderland, more 
specifically at the margins of the Qinghai–Tibet plateau. Since the 
Henan grasslands are located within Qinghai Province, one of the 
most “backward” (luohou) regions in the PRC, the area can be consid-
ered as economically marginalised, especially in view of the state’s 
concept of “modernity,” even though the state has tried to improve 
the socio-economic situation at the periphery. Moreover, the Henan 
grasslands are a sparsely inhabited pastoral area that has been a place 
of cultural interaction for centuries, and moreover an area where 
cultural hybridisation has emerged, which has led back to marginalisa-
tion. The exceptional history of present-day Henan Mongolian Au-
tonomous County has been shaped by a number of encounters: an 
ethno-cultural and religious affinity with Tibet, an entanglement with 
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Mongol groups, a relationship with the Qing court through the ad-
ministration system, and social and economic contact with the Mus-
lim and Han populations. Furthermore, there is broad diversity in 
terms of languages (Janhunen, Ha, and Tshe dpag rnam rgyal 2007), 
political systems, culture, and religion at the Sino-Tibetan borderland. 
Throughout history, Mongols and Tibetans have had a sense of soli-
darity and peaceful co-existence, and due to intermarriages they can 
be viewed as mixed. The Tibeto-Mongol population of the Henan 
grasslands “belonged to a unique cultural area, the limits of which 
were set by the jurisdiction of the Henan princes and tribal leaders” 
(Roche 2015: 12) centuries ago and later on by the CCP.  
After the founding of the PRC and the incorporation of the He-
nan grasslands into the Chinese state, one of the CCP’s strategies 
after the 1950s was to “civilise” its peoples. One tactic was the Ethnic 
Classification Project (1950–1980), which contributed to the margin-
alisation of China’s minority nationalities. Most of China’s minority 
nationalities reside at the margins, and because of their segregation 
from the Han, this ethnic segregation puts them at a disadvantage. 
For example, Mongols and Tibetans were portrayed by the state as 
“exotic” and “backward,” emphasising the sense of superiority of 
Han Chinese culture and the distinction between Han and minority 
nationalities. In terms of Henan Mongols, they are worse off relative 
to the Tibetan population as a minority within a minority area. But at 
the same time, as a result of the classification, by being classified as 
Mongol within a largely Tibetan area, the Henan grasslands were 
granted the status of a Mongol Autonomous County within 
Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. It was strategic state-
ment of Henan Mongols to display their “otherness” within a Tibetan 
surrounding. Henan Mongols are proud Mongols and “comfortable” 
citizens of China at the same time. 
Alongside the Ethnic Classification Project, the right to develop 
minority-language education was another project intended to “civi-
lise” people in minority areas. Public education facilities implement-
ing the CCP’s strategies sprung up, and bilingual education (Chinese 
and minority-language education) was put into place. But due to a 
limited range of higher-education opportunities as well as to often 
insufficient opportunities on the job market, minority-language edu-
cation once again led to marginalisation. In terms of Henan County, 
the language situation is even more complicated: using Mongolian as 
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the local common language in not realistic in Henan County because 
of the county’s linguistic “tibetanisation.” Mongolian speakers are 
often even socially excluded, because their employment opportunities 
are even worse in their Tibetan-speaking (and Chinese-speaking) 
surroundings. Nevertheless, to strengthen their awareness of being 
Mongol, Mongolian-language education in the private rather than the 
public education sector has been recently revived: this language-relat-
ed marginalisation is used by Henan Mongols as a strategy to distin-
guish themselves from the “others.”  
To conclude, Henan Mongols are beneficiaries of the party-
state’s civilising projects. As a result of these projects, Henan Mon-
gols are able to resist assimilation and to retain their distinct identity 
by re-inventing their “Mongolness.” But in reality, Henan Mongols’ 
close interaction with their Tibetan neighbours puts the authenticity 
of their Mongolness into question in the eyes of both other Mongols 
and Tibetans. The state has supported the hybridity and “otherness” 
of Henan Mongols in the interest of developing contemporary Henan 
County into a buffer zone. Dhondup (2002: 229) argues that the CCP 
may even have hoped that the Mongol Autonomous County would 
serve to diminish Tibetan influence in that area. Hence, to preserve 
this buffer zone, the state supports their re-definition as Mongolians 
through state-sponsored projects, mainly in the areas of culture, tradi-
tion, and language. In present-day Henan County, there is no (obvi-
ous) dissonance between Mongols and Tibetans in terms of educa-
tion, socio-economics, or religious belief, but there is some slight 
divergence in cultural habits and cultural markers. They see them-
selves as one solidary community within the Chinese nation, especial-
ly since the Mongolic groups have been separated from their histori-
cal kin over the course of history. However, Henan Mongols have 
adapted to and complied with national policies and, moreover, they 
are producing their own self-representation despite being influenced 
by the state-sponsored projects.  
Hence, it can be stated that Henan’s Mongols are performing a 
balancing act, shifting their identity according to their needs and con-
venience. In the context of the Chinese nation-state, Henan Mongols 
distance themselves from the “Chinese” by referring to their Mongol 
“nationality” or to their affiliation with the Tibetan cultural area of 
Amdo; whereas in the context of Amdo, they differentiate themselves 
from Tibetans through their “Mongolness.” Henan Mongols claim to 
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be Mongol, and therefore they accept their marginalisation within the 
Han-dominated state and subsequently the selling of their culture as 
an “exotic” attraction. At the same time, they distinguish and distance 
themselves from the surrounding Tibetans. Due both to the ac-
ceptance of their marginalisation and to their own self-marginalisa-
tion, they are strengthening their Mongol identity. In fact, the balanc-
ing act of this minority nationality can be interpreted as an act of 
marginalisation as well as an act of self-marginalisation.  
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